Research transparency

Australia’s export controls framework regulates the tangible export or intangible supply of goods and technologies that could have potential military application. Being a signatory to a number of international treaties and member of multilateral export control regimes with a common objective, Australia’s national laws implement an export controls framework that meet its international obligations.

The Defence and Strategic Goods List (DSGL) is a legislated list of goods and technologies that are controlled under the export controls framework. Transferring goods and technologies captured by the DSGL may require an export permit from the Defence Export Controls (DEC)in advance. The DSGL is a compilation of military, lethal and dual-use goods and technologies, reviewed regularly and reflects decisions of key Australian and international non-proliferation and export control regimes.

The DSGL is divided into two parts:

• Part 1 - military goods and technologies
• Part 2 - dual use goods and technologies (i.e. generally used for a civilian purpose but could have a military use)

'Export' of tangible goods and technologies is regulated under the Customs (Prohibited Exports) Regulations 1958 whereas 'supply', 'publication' and 'brokering' of intangible goods and technologies are regulated under the Defence Trade Controls Act 2012.

In addition, catch-all legislation regulates the export of goods and technologies that could be used in a Weapons of Mass Destruction Program, or for military end use, or that could prejudice the security, defence or international relations of Australia.

Controlled activities include:

• Export (eg physical transfer of items internationally)
• Supply (eg access to information through electronic means)
• Brokering (eg acting as an intermediary in arranging the transfer of goods between two places)
• Publication (eg placing information in the public domain behind a publisher’s paywall)

The Defence Trade Controls Amendment Act 2024, passed in March 2024, extends and adjusts previous export controls. The Act seeks to strike a balance between protecting Australia’s national security and supporting economic prosperity and research collaboration.

Australia is not the only country with export controls in place. Other foreign government agencies also regulate exports via controls and may require permission before export. This is usually when re-exporting or re-transferring a controlled technology from the country of origin. Many countries are members of the same international export controls regimes, so their controls may be similar, but they are not exactly the same.

Learn more about the University Policy on Export Controls (section 5.8.)

Sanctions impose restrictions on activities that relate to particular goods and services, persons, entities or countries. Under Australian sanctions legislation, the University is restricted from actions including provision to designated individuals, entities or countries of certain goods, services (such as technical assistance or training) or resources and dealing of certain assets. In some circumstances, it may be possible to obtain a permit to engage in an activity that would otherwise be prohibited by a sanction.

The Australian Government’s Guidelines to Counter Foreign Interference in the Australian University Sector were developed in partnership with the Australian University Sector to help manage risk to deepen resilience against foreign interference in the sector. As part of due diligence, risk assessment and management, the Guidelines state that universities require declaration of interest disclosures from personnel who are at risk of foreign interference, including identification of foreign affiliations and support.

Foreign interference has become a threat to national security and is a priority for security agencies due to its rapid and dynamic growth. Australia’s Counter Foreign Interference Strategy aims to protect Australia’s sovereignty, values and national interests, while acknowledging that a ‘multicultural, cohesive and open society and strong international partnerships are key strengths in countering foreign interference’.

Read the University of Melbourne’s submission to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, with recommendations, underpinning principles and values for managing interference (2020).

Through the List of Critical Technologies in the National Interest, a range of technology areas have been identified by the Australian Government as being of national or strategic significance, and activities in these fields are closely monitored. Sensitive research can include both critical technology and ‘dual use’ technology listed on the Defence and Strategic Goods List (DSGL), and certain commercially valuable technologies.

One of the University’s key forums for evaluating research activity and partnerships is the University’s Research Due Diligence Advisory Group (RDDAG) established in 2018. This group considers with whom we partner in research and what work we will undertake.

The Group provides review and point of escalation on research due diligence and related matters of reputational or national interest risk. It advises the Deputy Vice-Chancellor and the Vice-Chancellor’s Advisory Group on integrity, governance, social responsibility, political and security risks, with a focus on ensuring that research activities and collaborations support the University’s reputational standing and are aligned with the Australian national interest.

Where there are philanthropic gifts (as distinct from research contracts) to support research, these instances are referred to both the RDDAG and the Gift Committee. The Gift Committee– a committee of the University Council – oversees the University’s Gift Policy which is designed to ensure that all philanthropic gifts and sponsorships are lawfully, responsibly and ethically sourced.

Where there are confidentiality or other restrictions preventing us from disclosing information about projects, we will seek consent where we can, to support disclosure. Sensitive research may still not be disclosed.

These due diligence processes, and our alignment with the Australian Code for the Responsible Conduct of Research, are designed to provide full confidence that our research in defence and national security complies fully with Australian law and our obligations under export controls, international sanctions and countering foreign interference legislation.